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This paper provides an introduction to the
technology in respect of magnetic stripe cards,
magnetic stripe card readers, skimming devices
and personal identification number (PIN)
keypads.1 The author proposes four main
categories of magnetic stripe skimmers, based on
observations and electronic device examinations
at the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic
Science – SKL.
Background
Magnetic stripe cards, or magstripe cards, have been a
part of our everyday lives for decades; prepaid cards,
membership cards, loyalty cards, identification cards,
library cards, time cards, key cards and access control
cards are only a few examples. The physical possession
of a magstripe card is not necessary. The true value lies
in the specific data stored on the magnetic strip of the
card. This becomes extraordinarily clear when
considering fuel cards or financial transaction cards, and
probably explains the existence of magnetic stripe card
skimming devices, more known as skimmers.
Designing magstripe skimmers is not traditionally a
field of research, more a peripheral phenomenon. There
are innumerable articles and web pages that describes
magnetic stripe card frauds and different types of
skimmers, but no publications that provides a high
quality forensic examination. Masters and Turner
generally describe a case where a MSR500M (Mini123)
magnetic stripe reader from Escan Technologies
Corporation is repacked to a skimmer,2 Ramsbrock
attacks an access control system at University of
Maryland3 and Drimer attacks Ingenico i3300 and Dione
Xtreme PIN entry devices and point out the
vulnerabilities.4
The magnetic stripe card
The physical card size, embossment, recording
techniques, magnetic stripe coercivity, recording
capacity and density, data formats and encoding of
magnetic stripe (or magstripe) cards are some of the
properties defined by the standards ISO/IEC 7810 to
7813. Briefly, the magnetic stripe is an analogue data
carrier – similar to the audio cassette tape. The
magstripe can hold up to three separate audio tracks,
where each track has its own data storage format and
predefined maximum data length. Cards meeting the
ISO/IEC 7811 standard are encoded in the two-
frequency coherent-phase encoding (F/2F) technique,
also known as Aiken Biphase.  This encoding embeds
the magstripe card data with the mandatory clock pulse
used as a timing signal for the synchronisation of data
as the card is swiped. Briefly, a logic ‘1’ has a frequency
doubled to a logic ‘0’, hence the name ‘F/2F’.
The specifications for the track data differs for each
track, which in turn effects storage capacity. Track 1
(IATA) has a recording density of 210 bits per inch, and
uses a character set of 7 bits (6 bits plus one parity bit),
and stores up to 79 alphanumeric characters. Track 2
(ABA), 75 bits per inch, 4+1 bits per character and 40
numeric characters. Track 3 (Thrift) is defined to keep
210 bits per inch. Historically, the ISO/IEC 4909 track 3
banking card specific standard defined an encoding of
4+1 bits per character and 107 numeric characters.
Today, the ISO/IEC 7811 standard is also used for track 3
(6+1 bits characters).
Most financial transactions only need the card
information on track 2. This has the following structure:
a number of leading zeroes before the start sentinel
(SS), the primary account number (PAN), a field
separator (FS), additional data followed by discretionary
data, an end sentinel (ES), a longitudinal redundancy
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check (LRC) character used as a control checksum and
finally a series of ending zeroes. Track 1 is similar to
track 2, but has an addition field containing the name of
the card holder.
Magnetic stripe card readers
The magnetic stripe card reader (MSR) is used for
reading magstripe cards, or more specifically, to decode
and transfer the analogue content recorded on the
stripe into a digital representation. MSRs with writing
capability are also able to alter information on a specific
track by overwriting previously stored data. Adequate
software is often required for interpretation or for
editing the data.
Reading the data 
Several steps are carried out when a magstripe card is
swiped through a card reader. The magnetic head reads
a specific track and registers its magnetic flux, which
induces a proportional voltage signal, representing the
F/2F encoded data stored on the magstripe. The voltage
signal is passed into an amplifier to boost the signal;
waveform adjustments and noise filtering might also be
performed to make a better distinction between a logic
‘0’ and logic ‘1’. The data in analogue format is
converted into digital format by an analogue to digital
converter (A/D converter or ADC), where the output data
is clocked into a F/2F decoder for clock pulse signal and
the separation of the data to be held on the card. The
decoded magstripe data can now be utilised, in that it
can be transferred to another function or interpreted
into a meaningful representation.
The F/2F decoder chip 
The steps described in the reading process are almost
always carried out by a dedicated magnetic stripe
decoder chip, or F/2F decoder IC (an integrated circuit),
designed for amplifying the signal, adjusting the
waveform, A/D conversion and F/2F decoding. The
output signals from most F/2F decoder ICs are similar or
the same: a card load signal for swiping the card, and
the stream of extracted binary data and a clock pulse or
strobe signal for stream synchronisation. Some of the
output signals might be active low, which practically
means that the signals must be inverted before utilising
them.
Multitrack F/2F decoders are integrated circuits with
an ability to decode two or three tracks in parallel.
These decoders are often used together with multitrack
magnetic heads, where each head has its own pair of
signal lines to register track specific positive and
negative induced voltage levels, but share a common
ground signal. 
Other magnetic stripe card reader features 
The programmable microprocessor control unit, or
microchip, are found in most magnetic stripe card
readers. The integrated microprocessor control unit
functions are developed to coordinate the data flow
between the F/2F decoder and any peripheral hardware,
such as physical connectors or non-volatile memory,
and may also have functions to interpret the F/2F
output, bidirectional reading, timekeeping, encryption,
and such like. Some MSRs may use a PIN to prevent the
unauthorised retrieval of data.
A non-volatile memory, for example an electrically
erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) or
a flash memory, is often used in systems where
synchronisation of data is needed, such as monetary
transactions. The memory organises the magstripe card
data in slots or posts, often with additional information
such as time stamps or the amount of payment. The
non-volatile memory is either integrated into the
microprocessor control unit, or in memory integrated
circuit, and soldered on to the printed circuit board.
Some magnetic stripe card readers may also use a
separate real time clock circuit to provide accurate
timestamps.
Magnetic stripe card reader products 
Many magnetic stripe card reader products only act as
portable or handheld standalone magstripe readers, but
the majority of the MSRs are integrated into or
embedded in some sort of system, such as point-of-sale
terminals, automated teller machines (ATM) or petrol
pumps. All of these require a permanent or a temporary
communication link between the host, such as the
computer, transaction system or a database query
server, and the specific magnetic stripe card reader
integrated system for the synchronisation of electronic
monetary transactions, to validate the card holder, or for
controlling access.
Online, semi-online and offline
Many MSR integrated systems have the capability to
interact against an on-line host for real-time operations,
such as key card access system or ATMs. If the host
accidentally disconnects, the magnetic stripe card
reader has the capability to retain unprocessed card
data in a non-volatile memory for synchronisation at a
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later time. Card access systems are probably excluded,
because of the need for instant verification. Semi-online
MSR integrated systems connect to a host when
appropriate; via a GSM modem, land based telephone
line, low-frequency RF, Bluetooth or on any other
communication product. Many point of sale terminals,
car park ticket machines, and self-service kiosk systems
are examples of semi-online MSR systems. Offline or
standalone magnetic stripe card readers are portable or
handheld devices, commonly used by retailers,
merchants, restaurants, and taxi companies, with little
or no possibility of interacting regularly online. These
MSRs are equipped with a non-volatile memory for the
purpose of storing the data from a card temporarily. The
retrieval of the data is carried out via a data
communication interface, and often protected by a PIN.
Other features
Most magnetic stripe card reader integrated systems
have their own method of security to prevent tampering,
such as alarm triggers or intrusion detection functions.
The security mechanism is often integrated on the
printed circuit board. To increase the security and to
protect the data stored on the magstripe card from
unauthorised use, a PIN is often required for the
purposes of verification of the card holder. This is
entered on a PIN keypad device or on a PIN entry
device. The latter is used together with or integrated in
the point of sale terminal.
Magnetic stripe card skimming devices
A magnetic stripe card skimming device – a magstripe
skimmer, in short, a skimmer – can technically be
described as a device with a concealed circuitry or
mechanism engineered in such a way as to duplicate
the data on the magstripe card.
Four skimming device categories 
Based on experiences and observations at SKL,
skimming devices can roughly be divided into four main
categories, which are proposed as follows: unmodified
commercial or commodity off-the-shelf (COTS) MSRs,
modified COTS MSRs, COTS MSR hardware based
skimmers and uniquely engineered skimmers.
1. Unmodified COTS magnetic stripe card readers are
plain MSRs with the ability to store the data from
the card. An unmodified COTS MSR is not really a
skimmer, but can be used in the same way.
2. Modified COTS magnetic stripe card readers are
devices that have been tampered with in some
way. Some extra electronics is added to skim data.
Common targets are point of sale terminals and
petrol pumps, where employees or technical
designs unintentionally allow the unauthorised
opening of cabinets or the interception of terminal
housings. In such cases, security switches and
alarm triggers have been bypassed or disabled.
3. COTS magnetic stripe card reader hardware based
skimmers consist of electronic parts from one or
more dismantled COTS MSRs. In simpler cases, all
the parts originate from the same source. The
attacker does not necessarily need to understand
how the architecture of the MSR, providing the
electronic components are put together in the
correct order. In more complicated cases, parts are
taken from different magnetic stripe card reader
products and integrated within its circuitry. Making
these types of skimmers saves time, compared to
skimmers that are uniquely engineered.
4. Uniquely engineered skimmers are designed and
built individually. There is a great difference in
quality between poorly constructed devices to
pure masterpieces. Generally, the smaller design,
the harder it is to reverse engineer it.
General technical description of skimmers
Some of the earliest skimming devices observed in
Sweden were COTS MSR hardware based skimmers,
encapsulated in fake slot-in readers and attached onto
ATMs. The more advanced contained recordable MP3
players embedded in homemade ATM panels. Each time
a magstripe card was put into the slot, the MP3 player
recorded the analogue data on the magnetic stripe –
typically track 2. In the most likely scenario, after the
skimmer was removed, the audio file was decoded in
the same way as for regular magnetic stripe card
readers.
The majority of skimmers seen at the time of writing
are equipped with a microprocessor control unit and a
physical interface for retrieving the data stored on the
magstripe. A number of significant features are
integrated into the microprocessor control unit or
represented by discrete components, such as a memory
integrated circuit for storing data, a battery or battery
pack for running the skimming device circuitry, a
separate magnetic head for parallel magstripe reading,
a F/2F decoder, a clock and date function or a real time
clock for the purpose of providing synchronisation
between the data skimmed from the card and retrieved,
or the PIN obtained surreptitiously in some way, and
perhaps an oscillator or a crystal to act as an external
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drive for the microprocessor control unit.
Radio frequency communication devices 
In some cases, the attacker does not include a non-
volatile memory to store the data swiped from the card.
Instead, the analogue data signal skimmed from the
magnetic head is obtained, and then transferred to a
standard commodity off-the-shelf radio frequency
transmitter module. A corresponding radio frequency
receiver module A/D converts the analogue radio
signals and puts the resulting digital data stream into a
microprocessor control unit for further processing. It is
not possible to secure the card data that has been
skimmed if only the transmitting part of the skimming
equipment is seized from a crime scene.
There are also skimming devices where a memory to
store the data on the magstripe is combined with a
frequency receiver transceiver, which listens for polling
devices. When a link is established between the
skimmer and the polling device, the card data is
transmitted to the receiving unit. After completion, the
memory is emptied or overwritten by new card data. The
COTS radio frequency modules normally operate on one
of the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical radio
bands, where the most common centre frequencies are
433, 868, 915 and 2400 MHz. The higher the frequency,
the shorter the range. Different COTS transmitters and
receivers use different modulation techniques, such as
frequency modulation (FM), amplitude modulation (AM)
or on-off keying (OOK) modulation.
Skimmers with a Bluetooth radio frequency module
using the serial universal asynchronous
receiver/transmitter (UART) communication standard
have also been examined at SKL. Bluetooth devices do
not necessarily require specialised hardware for
obtaining card data that is skimmed or stored; a mobile
telephone or a laptop equipped with a Bluetooth
module and a program for serial communication is
sufficient.
Retrieving the PIN 
Many magnetic stripe reader integrated systems require
a PIN code to validate or confirm the card holder. There
are two major technical methods of obtaining the PIN:
externally or internally. Concealed pinhole cameras that
film the PIN keypad have been found on apparatus such
as ATMs and petrol pumps. These cameras send the
images of the use of the keypad by wire or wirelessly to
a video recording unit, such as a portable multimedia
player or a cheap video camera.
External interception between a separate magnetic
stripe reader unit and the system is theoretically
possible. However, the traffic though the cable may be
encrypted, which is often the case for point of sale
terminal systems. Such interception has not yet been
observed at SKL.
There are internal methods to obtain a PIN where the
PIN keypad encapsulation or housing is opened, any
possible alarm triggers are disabled, bypassed or
removed and the keypad pressings are recorded.
Separate wires are soldered on to the original keypad
printed circuit board switches, and connected to a
recording circuitry. A second method of attack that has
been observed is when a separate overlay keypad
printed circuit board or keypad membrane is placed in
between the original keypad printed circuit board and
the rubber keypad.
Discussion 
There is no central coordination of magnetic skimming
device in Sweden, hence there are no statistics or
numbers available about such cases. However, the local
police authorities are very aware of skimmers and are,
in some situations, also able to retrieve magnetic stripe
card data. SKL is specialised in forensic examinations
and has a better opportunity to make qualified analyses
to extract skimmed data and to reverse engineer
electronic devices. One of the most frequent difficulties
is the interpretation of raw binary data extracted from
non-volatile memories. There is no standard way to
define skimmed card data, which in many cases only
result in a binary data dump.
Conclusions 
Based on the observations and electronic examinations
at the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic Science
– SKL, the four main skimming device categories
demonstrate the complexity of the methods that can be
employed to attach a magnetic stripe card and obtain
the PIN.
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